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I. INTRODUCTION
Introspection plays a crucial role in modem philosophy in two different 
ways. From the beginnings of modern philosophy, introspection has been 
used as a tool for philosophical exploration in a variety of thought experi­
ments. But modern philosophers (e.g., Locke and Hume) also tried to char­
acterize the nature of introspection as a psychological phenomenon. In 
contemporary philosophy, introspection is still frequently used in thought 
experiments. And in the analytic tradition, philosophers have tried to char­
acterize conceptually necessary features of introspection.1 But over the last 
several decades, philosophers have devoted relatively little attention to the 
cognitive characteristics of introspection. This has begun to change, 
impelled largely by a fascinating body of work on how children and autistic 
individuals understand the mind.2 In a pair of recent papers, Stephen Stich 
and I have drawn on this empirical work to develop an account of intro­
spection or self-awareness.3 Here, I will elaborate and defend this cognitive 
theory of introspection further and argue that if the account is right, it may
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have important ramifications for psychological and philosophical debates 
over the self.
Since I will cover a rather diverse set of issues, let me begin by map­
ping out the structure of what follows. In section II, I will set out the most 
prominent account of introspection in the recent literature, the Theory 
Theory of self-awareness, according to which the capacity to detect one’s 
own mental states depends on the capacity to detect other people’s mental 
states. I’ll then sketch the alternative “Monitoring Mechanism” account that 
Stich and I have defended. I will go on to offer a couple of new arguments 
for the Monitoring Mechanism account, and I will argue that the Monitoring 
Mechanism is plausibly modularized to an interesting extent. I will also 
respond to the worry that evolutionary considerations cast doubt on the the­
ory. In section III, I review psychological work on the concept of self, and I 
argue that the Monitoring Mechanism theory suggests that there is an impor­
tant notion of self that is largely neglected in the psychological literature and 
that needs to be distinguished from a concept of self that derives from the 
Theory of Mind. In the fourth section, I argue that this distinction between 
two concepts of self helps to explain recalcitrant philosophical problems 
concerning the self.
II. THE MODULARITY OF THE MIND’S EYE
The best known and most influential account of self-awareness in the recent 
literature is the Theory Theory of self-awareness.4 According to this account, 
one determines one’s own mental states by using a “theory” of mind, and 
this theory of mind is the very same theory that one uses to determine the 
mental states of others. In philosophy, the Theory Theory of self-awareness 
was first proposed by Wilfrid Sellars,5 but its growing influence in cognitive 
science is largely due to the work in developmental psychology on the 
understanding of other minds or mindreading.
To make the view clear, it is important to review a bit of the history in 
developmental psychology. The prevailing view of how children (and 
adults) understand other minds is that there is a body of information that 
guides psychological attribution, prediction, and explanation. This body of 
information is often referred to as the child’s “Theory of Mind,” and it has 
been the subject of intense empirical and theoretical investigations. The bulk 
of this research explores the child’s developing capacity to understand the 
beliefs, desires, and perceptions of others. For instance, the best known 
result in this area is that children under the age of four tend to fail the “false 
belief task.” In one version of the false belief task, the child is shown a 
candy box and asked what she thinks is in the box. After the child says that
172
there is candy in the box, she is shown that, in fact, there are pencils in the 
box. The box is then closed and the child is asked what another person (who 
is not present) will think is in the box. Three-year-olds tend to say that the 
other person will think that there are pencils in the box, while children over 
the age of four tend to answer correctly that the other person will think that 
there is candy in the box.6 These sorts of findings are taken as evidence for 
the development or maturation of the child’s Theory of Mind.
The core idea of the Theory Theory of self-awareness is that the child’s 
capacity for understanding her own mind depends on the same Theory of 
Mind that she uses to understand other minds. Alison Gopnik has been per­
haps the most visible advocate for this view. Here is a representative state­
ment of the Theory Theory from Gopnik and Andrew Meltzoff:
Even though we seem to perceive our own mental states directly, 
this direct perception is an illusion. In fact, our know ledge of our­
selves, like our knowledge of others, is the result of a theory.7
The Theory Theory has also been defended in the literature on autism. A 
large body of evidence indicates that autistic individuals have severe defi­
ciencies in their understanding of other minds, and this has led researchers 
to propose analogous deficiencies in autistic individuals' understanding of 
their own mental states.8 Uta Frith and Francesca Happe express the view as 
follows:
[I]f the mechanism which underlies the computation of mental 
states is dysfunctional, then self-knowledge is likely to be 
impaired just as is the knowledge of other minds. The logical 
extension of the ToM [Theory of Mind] deficit account of 
autism is that individuals with autism may know as little about 
their own minds as about the minds of other people. This is not 
to say that these individuals lack mental states, but that in an 
important sense they are unable to reflect on their mental states.
Simply put, they lack the cognitive machinery to represent their 
thoughts and feelings as thoughts and feelings.9
Theory Theorists haven’t been sufficiently clear about exactly how the 
Theory of Mind fits into the rest of the process of self-awareness.10 But what 
is clear is that they regard Theory of Mind as a necessary component of self­
awareness. All access to one’s own mental states is “theoretical” in the sense 
that it depends on the Theory of Mind. So one cannot detect one’s own men­
tal states without exploiting the Theory of Mind that is used for detecting 
others’ mental states.
In response to this growing consensus, Stich and I argued, rather, that 
the mind contains a “Monitoring Mechanism,” a special purpose mechanism 
(or set of mechanisms) for detecting one’s own mental states, and this mech­
anism is quite independent from the mechanisms that are used to detect the 
mental states of others. On the theory we develop, the Monitoring Mechanism
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(MM) takes as input one’s own mental state (e.g., a belief, desire, or inten­
tion) and produces as output the belief that one has that mental state. So, for 
instance, if one believes that p  and the Monitoring Mechanism is activated (in 
the right way), it takes the representation p  in the Belief Box and produces the 
belief I believe that p  (see figure 1). This mechanism is computationally 
extremely simple. For instance, to produce representations of one’s own 
desires, the MM simply copies a representation from the Desire Box, embeds 
the copy in a representation schema of the form: I desire that . .  . , and then 
inserts this new representation into the Belief Box. Our proposal, then, was 
that the Monitoring Mechanism is an independent introspection mechanism 





FIGURE 1: MONITORING MECHANISM THEORY OF SELF-AWARENESS
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Although we argue that the Monitoring Mechanism theory is a much 
more plausible account of self-awareness than the Theory Theory, we do not 
deny that one can use the Theory of Mind on oneself. Indeed, we maintain 
that Theory of Mind is probably required for reasoning about one’s own 
mental states, i.e., using information about one’s own mental states to pre­
dict and explain one’s own mental states and behavior. However, it is quite 
a different matter for detecting one’s own mental states. The detection of 
one’s own mental states does not depend on the capacity for detecting or 
reasoning about other people’s mental states. Thus, on our account there are 
special introspection mechanisms for detecting one’s own mental states but 
not for reasoning about one’s own mental states.12
EVIDENCE
Theory Theorists have put forth a number of empirical arguments for the 
Theory Theory of self-awareness. Stich and I provide detailed responses to 
these arguments and offer a few of our own arguments against the Theory 
Theory.13 I won’t rehearse all of those arguments here, but I do want to 
review briefly one of the arguments against the Theory Theory and then 
offer a couple of new arguments.
Developmental Asynchronies
The most explicit and carefully charted argument for the Theory Theory 
comes from Gopnik and Meltzoff.14 According to the Theory Theory, self­
attributions will be subject to the same deficiencies as other-attributions. 
Hence, young children’s mistakes on attributing mental states to others 
should find parallels in self-attribution. Gopnik and Meltzoff maintain that 
in fact children’s understanding of their own mental states does develop in 
close parallel with their understanding of others’ mental states. However, a 
closer look at the data suggests that the developmental evidence actually 
poses a problem for the Theory Theory. For on a wide range of tasks, chil­
dren do not exhibit the parallel performance predicted by the Theory 
Theory. Children are capable of attributing knowledge and ignorance to 
themselves before they are capable of attributing those states to others; they 
are capable of attributing certain perceptual states to themselves before they 
are capable of attributing such states to others; there is even some evidence 
that children are capable of attributing false beliefs to themselves before 
they are capable of attributing such states to others.15 Hence, although 
Gopnik and Meltzoff claim that the developmental evidence supports the 
Theory Theory of self-awareness, the evidence actually seems to undermine 
the Theory Theory in a fairly serious way. The Monitoring Mechanism 
account easily accommodates the data, however. The Monitoring Mechanism 
is proposed as an innate and early emerging mechanism, and the account
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does not predict that the capacity to detect one’s own mental states will 
develop in parallel with the capacity to detect mental states of others.
Egocentric attributions
A further argument against the Theory Theory emerges from the develop­
mental data when one considers the kinds of mistakes that toddlers make 
about other minds. When asked what another person, the “target,” thinks or 
wants, toddlers do not respond at chance. Rather, for an important class of 
cases, they tend to attribute their own mental states “egocentrically.” Indeed, 
this is how Theory Theorists characterize the mistakes. For instance, in one 
task, children are told to hide an object from the experimenter, and young 
two-year-olds failed this task. Gopnik and Meltzoff describe the young chil­
dren’s mistakes as follows: “24-month-olds consistently hid the object ego­
centrically, either placing it on the experimenter’s side of the screen or 
holding it to themselves so that neither they nor the experimenter could see 
it.”16 Similarly, Repacholi and Gopnik found that fourteen-month-old chil­
dren shared the kind of food they themselves liked rather than the food that 
the target exhibited a preference for. The experimenter made a facial expres­
sion of disgust or happiness after tasting either Goldfish crackers or broc­
coli. Although the fourteen-month-olds consistently shared the crackers 
(their own preference), the eighteen-month-olds were sensitive to the facial 
expressions of preference. Repacholi and Gopnik suggest the possibility that 
although the fourteen-month-olds “were beginning to acquire a psycholog­
ical conception of desire, it was, nonetheless, egocentric. Thus, although 
they understood that people request things because of some underlying 
desire, they mistakenly believe that everyone’s desires are the same.”17 
Elsewhere, Meltzoff, Gopnik, and Repacholi suggest that the performance 
of eighteen-month-olds on this task indicates that they have a more devel­
oped Theory of Mind: “This is a developmental achievement inasmuch as 
fourteen-month-olds did not do this. Instead, they always gave the experi­
menter crackers, their own preference, regardless of the experimenter’s 
expressed desires. This work suggests that even very young children, eigh­
teen-month-olds, may have a nonegocentric understanding of the differences 
between their own mental states and those of others in some cases.”18 These 
experimental findings of egocentiic desire attributions are corroborated by 
ecological reports.19 For instance, when young children help others in dis­
tress, they tend to offer their own comfort objects (e.g., their teddy bear or 
blanket) to the distressed person.20
For the Monitoring Mechanism theory, early egocentric errors in min- 
dreading pose no problem. Even before the young child has an adequate 
theory of, say, desire, she can use the Monitoring Mechanism to determine 
her own desires and preferences, and she can subsequently attribute her 
preferences to a target. By contrast, it is hard to see how a Theory Theorist
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can accommodate egocentric attributions. For if the child has a deficient 
Theory of Mind, such that she is incapable of detecting the desires of oth­
ers, then the Theory Theory predicts that she should also be incapable of 
detecting her own desires. Egocentric mistakes indicate an asynchrony—the 
young child is apparently aware of her own mental states and attributes them 
to others before she is capable of detecting the other person’s distinctive men­
tal states. Without further explanation, it is difficult to see how a Theory 
Theorist can consistently maintain both that toddlers have an early egocentric 
Theory of Mind and that one’s access to one’s own mental states depends on 
the same theory that is used to detect the mental states of others.21
Dissociations in psychopathologies
In addition to appeals to developmental evidence, a number of philosophers 
and psychologists have recently argued that the Theory Theory of self­
awareness is supported by psychopathological evidence on autism and 
schizophrenia.22 The data on autism are of particular significance for Theory 
Theorists, since autistic children are widely regarded as having deficient 
mindreading capacities. For instance, autistic children continue to fail the 
false belief task well after their mental age peers pass the task. And studies 
of spontaneous speech indicate that autistic children basically never talk 
about cognitive mental states like beliefs or thoughts.23 Given the Theory of 
Mind deficit in autism, the Theory Theory predicts that autistic children 
should be similarly impaired at detecting their own mental states. Carruthers 
and Frith and Happe argue that case studies indicate that autistic individu­
als do lack access to their own mental states.24 However, a close inspection 
of the evidence tends to undermine rather than support the Theory Theory.25 
For instance, in a diverse range of case studies, autistic individuals report 
their own mental states much better than Theory Theorists predicted. The 
Monitoring Mechanism theory has a ready explanation for this: the Moni­
toring Mechanism might be intact in autism despite the deficit to Theory of 
Mind.26
Although the evidence adduced by Carruthers and Frith and Happe 
seems to provide better evidence against the Theory Theory rather than for 
it, the evidence is in any case rather fragmentary, relying largely on case 
studies. There is new experimental evidence, however, that further confirms 
the claim that the Monitoring Mechanism is intact in autism despite the 
problems with Theory of Mind. In a recent set of studies, Farrant and col­
leagues found that autistic children did remarkably well on “metamemory” 
tests.27 In metamemory tasks, subjects are asked to memorize a set of items 
and subsequently to report on the strategies they used to remember the 
items. In light of arguments from Theory Theorists, the experimenters 
expected autistic children to perform much worse than non-autistic children 
on metamemory tasks: “On the basis of evidence that children with autism
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are delayed in passing false belief tasks and on the basis of arguments that 
mentalizing and metacognition involve related processes, we predicted that 
children with autism would show impaired performance relative to controls 
on false belief tasks and on metamemory tasks and that children’s perfor­
mances on the two types of task would be related.”28 However, contrary to 
the researchers’ predictions, there was no significant difference between the 
performance of autistic children and non-autistic children on a range of 
metamemory tasks. In one task, the subject was asked to remember a set of 
numbers that were given. The children were subsequently asked, “What did 
you do to help you to remember all the numbers that I said?” Like the other 
children in the study, most of the autistic children gave some explanation 
that fit into the categories of “thinking,” “listening,” or “strategies.” For 
instance, one autistic child said, “I did 68, then the rest, instead of being six, 
eight, you put 68.” Indeed, Farrant and colleagues claim that it is clear from 
the data that “there was no relation between passing/failing false belief tasks 
and the categories of response given to the metamemory question.”29 
Although the results flouted the experimenters’ Theory-Theory-based predic­
tion, they fit perfectly with the Monitoring Mechanism theory, for the 
Monitoring Mechanism can be intact even when Theory of Mind is damaged.
THE INTROSPECTION MODULE
Thus, the Monitoring Mechanism theory fits the available evidence much 
better than the Theory Theory. Of course, historically, the most venerable 
account of introspection is not the Theory Theory (which is likely an inven­
tion of the twentieth century), but rather that introspection is a species of 
perception, inner perception. On traditional inner-perception models, one 
detects one’s own mental states via experience or phenomenological fea­
tures.30 If the perception-model of introspection is developed in this way, 
then the Monitoring Mechanism theory diverges in an important way. For 
the Monitoring Mechanism does not rely on phenomenological features for 
identifying one’s beliefs and desires.31 In that sense, on the Monitoring Mecha­
nism account, introspection is quite different from perception. However, 
there is an important way in which the Monitoring Mechanism might be 
akin to perception: it’s plausible that both systems are modularized.
Perceptual systems are the paradigm examples of modules, as modu­
larity is developed in Fodor’s classic treatment in The Modularity o f  Mind. 
The central feature of modularity for Fodor is informational encapsulation.32 
A cognitive mechanism is encapsulated if it has little or no access to infor­
mation outside of its own proprietary database. Perceptual systems tend to 
be encapsulated—there are restrictions on the kinds of information that are 
processed by perceptual systems. The classic illustration of perceptual 
encapsulation is the fact that the Miiller-Lyer illusion persists even after one
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knows about the illusion. Apparently, the perceptual system is insensitive to 
the knowledge that the lines are the same length. Fodor maintains that there 
are a number of other features that tend to co-occur with encapsulation. And 
Fodor maintains that perceptual systems also have these correlated features. 
Among other things, perceptual systems tend to be dedicated to particular 
tasks, they have characteristic ontogenies, they exhibit characteristic pat­
terns of breakdown, and perceptual processing tends to be very fast.
The Monitoring Mechanism, like the perceptual systems, has many of 
the features of modules. Like perceptual systems, the Monitoring Mechanism 
is dedicated to a particular task, it has a characteristic and early ontogeny, it 
seems to exhibit a characteristic pattern of breakdown,53 and it seems to be 
selectively spared in autism. It also exhibits fast, but restricted processing. 
The last point is of some significance. The processing capacity of the 
Monitoring Mechanism is extremely limited; it simply plugs a representa­
tion into the self-attribution schema. Thus, while it may not be strictly 
speaking encapsulated, the Monitoring Mechanism resembles encapsulated 
mechanisms in that it does not engage in any remotely intelligent general- 
purpose reasoning. We might, then, think of the Monitoring Mechanism as 
the Introspection Module
POSSIBLE FUNCTIONS OF INTROSPECTION
The evidence suggests, then, that the capacity for detecting one’s own men­
tal states is subserved by a Monitoring Mechanism that is quite independent 
from Theory of Mind. One might wonder, though, why we would have such 
a mechanism.33 The problem is especially acute if one assumes that the 
Monitoring Mechanism evolved before Theory of Mind. As noted above, 
the developmental evidence indicates that the Monitoring Mechanism 
emerges earlier than Theory of Mind. So one might suppose that, if 
ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny, then the Monitoring Mechanism should 
be phylogenetically older than Theory of Mind. Of course, the claim that 
ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny is hardly a strict law.36 So it is possible 
that the Monitoring Mechanism emerged after or contemporaneously with 
Theory of Mind. Nonetheless, the claim that ontogeny recapitulates phy­
logeny has been a good heuristic, and it’s probably better to be on the side 
of the heuristic rather than against it.
The clearest way to develop and confirm evolutionary accounts of cog­
nitive mechanisms is by appeal to evidence comparing distantly related 
species that share a cognitive mechanism or related species in which the cog­
nitive mechanisms diverge.37 Unfortunately, in the case of introspection, we 
have no comparative evidence that speaks to this issue directly, so it’s diffi­
cult to identify the evolutionary function of the Monitoring Mechanism with 
any confidence. However, to forestall the criticisms that such a mechanism
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would have been good for nothing, let me make clear a couple of different 
ways in which the Monitoring Mechanism could have been adaptive.38
One of the arguments I presented above against the Theory Theory is 
the fact that young children tend to attribute their own mental states ego- 
centrically. Although egocentric attribution typically shows up most clearly 
in the mistakes that children (and adults39) make, in fact, the practice of ego­
centric attribution likely forms a large and productive part of our mindread- 
ing abilities. In trying to figure out another person’s mental states, one quite 
successful strategy for a large set of states is to attribute one’s own mental 
states to the target. For we typically share a broad background of similar 
beliefs with those we attribute beliefs to. This is also true for a wide range 
of preferences—my conspecifics and I typically have similar tastes and 
basic desires. Indeed, even in the Goldfish crackers and broccoli experiment, 
it’s likely that the young infants who “mistakenly” attribute their own pref­
erences to the target are adopting a fairly effective strategy. Thus, a mecha­
nism that provides access to one’s own mental states might provide a basis 
for attributing mental states to others. And there are lots of reasons to think 
that it’s adaptive to be good at attributing mental states to others.40
In a quite different way, monitoring one’s own mental states might have 
been useful to enable more efficient planning. Perhaps the most influential 
account of planning in recent philosophy and artificial intelligence is 
Michael Bratman’s “planning theory of intention.”41 Although it is not 
entirely explicit in Bratman’s planning theory, the capacity to detect one’s 
own mental states can play a crucial role in enabling efficient planning, as I 
hope to explain.
Since there are always indefinitely many possible courses of action and 
the world is constantly changing, ideal practical reasoning is quite impossi­
ble. It would require a constant assessment of the best thing to do, and 
humans have neither the leisure nor the capacity for such endless calcula­
tion. Bratman argues that one way out of this problem for a resource-limited 
creature is by committing to an intention in such a way that one no longer 
deliberates all things considered about what to do. Rather, one’s commit­
ment to an intention constrains and structures subsequent planning and deci­
sion making. One crucial part of the theory is that once you commit to a 
plan, there is a wide range of incompatible options that you don’t even con­
sider—they are “filtered” out 42 For instance, if I commit to going to 
England on July 15, then I don’t even consider the option of having a din­
ner party on July 16. Of course, this deliberative neglect of a range of 
options carries a certain cost—for some of the options that aren’t considered 
might have been adopted had the options been considered in a thorough pro­
cess of deliberation. However, in many other cases, the options that are 
neglected would not have been adopted in any case, so in those (presum­
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ably, more typical) cases, one saves the time and energy of deliberation 
without incurring any costs. The other crucial feature of committing to an 
intention is that this structures one’s subsequent deliberations, e.g., about the 
best way to execute the plan. So, once I’m committed to going to England, 
I generate the subplan that I need to get my passport renewed. In the long 
run, this filtering and structuring plausibly makes one’s planning much more 
efficient than a constant calculation of utility maximization.
In her work in Artificial Intelligence, Martha Pollack has argued that 
another way that resource-bounded agents can make their reasoning more 
efficient is by “overloading” their intentions.43 The idea is that if an agent 
has a goal, she can try to determine whether that goal can be satisfied in the 
course of executing some plan that has already been adopted. So, for 
instance, suppose I realize that I need to buy a present for a party that will 
occur tomorrow. I can then consider whether I already have a plan that will 
take me near an appropriate vendor. If I had already planned to go down­
town to the post office, I can “overload” this prior plan to include a trip to 
the store. Not only will this make the errand running more efficient, Pollack 
suggests that by overloading one’s intentions in this way, one’s reasoning is 
also more efficient.
How does all this connect to the utility of the Monitoring Mechanism? 
What I want to suggest is that overloading or committing to one’s intentions 
is enabled by having a mechanism that delivers beliefs about one’s inten­
tions. Since Bratman and Pollack develop their theories in contexts in which 
it is simply assumed that the reasoning agents (be they human or artificial) 
can represent their own intentions, this part of the theory is never made 
explicit. However, unless one knows about one’s own intentions, it’s diffi­
cult to see how one can overload one’s intentions. Similarly if you don’t 
know which intentions you’re “committed” to, it’s hard to see how those 
intentions can subsequently inform one’s planning. The obvious way to 
implement the kind of reasoning that Bratman and Pollack promote would 
involve having beliefs about your own intentions. If the agent has a belief 
about what she intends to do, this belief can structure her further decision 
making. Of course, the Monitoring Mechanism would serve the function of 
delivering such beliefs. Hence, it seems that this mechanism might play a 
crucial role in facilitating efficient planning. Again, I’m not arguing that the 
Monitoring Mechanism actually evolved to serve this function. To make 
such a claim plausible one would need a body of comparative evidence. 
Rather, the point is to show that there could be fairly direct advantages to 
having a Monitoring Mechanism, so the mechanism can’t be faulted on gen­
eral evolutionary grounds.
To summarize this section, I’ve offered a number of arguments for why 
the Monitoring Mechanism account of introspection is more plausible than
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the rival Theory Theory account. I’ve also proposed some reasons to think 
that such a mechanism could have been adaptive. And I’ve suggested that 
this Mechanism is modular. There certainly is not sufficient evidence for this 
claim to parade it as an obvious truth. But given the available evidence, it is 
a plausible conjecture that there is a modular Monitoring Mechanism—a 
dedicated mechanism for detecting one’s own mental states that is indepen­
dent of the capacity to detect mental states of others.
III. THE SELF-CONCEPT IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE
If the foregoing account of introspection is right, it might have significant 
implications for psychological work on the concept of self.44 For the 
Monitoring Mechanism account suggests that there is a basic concept of self 
that has been largely neglected in the psychological literature. There is a 
vast literature on the self in psychology elaborating, often in great detail, 
how people think of themselves. Much of this work focuses on issues that 
relate to self-esteem and self-worth.45 But here I want to focus on the 
ontogeny of “self-conception,” i.e., when children develop a concept of self. 
Perhaps the best known method for addressing this question is the mirror 
self-recognition task.46 More recently, in light of the research on mindread- 
ing, researchers have suggested rather that the child’s concept of self 
depends on the Theory of Mind 47 If the Monitoring Mechanism theory is 
right, then there is a notion of self that isn’t captured by either of these 
approaches.
The Body’s “I ” ’
There is a long tradition in developmental psychology and primatology of 
using “mirror self-recognition” tests to descry awareness of self in infants 
and nonlinguistic animals. The first study on mirror self-recognition was 
reported by Gordon Gallup.48 Gallup found that chimpanzees respond in 
self-exploratory ways to their images in mirrors; for example, they inspect 
parts of their body that are difficult to see without a mirror, and they will 
reach up to investigate marks that were surreptitiously placed on the fore­
head before the mirror was made available. Subsequent research on human 
children showed that children begin to exhibit this kind of behavior by eigh­
teen to twenty-four months.49 A wide range of further comparative research 
has found, surprisingly, that most species do not exhibit this kind of self- 
exploratory behavior. For instance, it has not been convincingly demon­
strated in any species of monkey.50
Although mirror self-recognition is sometimes treated as evidence that 
chimpanzees have a psychological understanding of themselves,51 there are
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fairly obvious alternative explanations. For instance, Daniel Povinelli main­
tains that passing the mirror tasks doesn't require a concept of self as psy­
chological subject: “Gallup believes that chimpanzees possess a 
psychological understanding of themselves. In contrast, I believe these apes 
possess an explicit mental representation of the position and movement of 
their own bodies—what could be called a kinesthetic self-concept.”52 On 
Povinelli’s account it is the “contingency between the self's actions and the 
actions in the mirror” that “triggers the formation of an equivalence relation 
between the organism’s internal self-representation and the external stimuli 
(the mirror image).”53 In fact, as Povinelli points out, this is similar to the 
proposal Gallup made in his initial paper reporting the findings. “Gallup’s 
(1970) initial speculation was that ‘self-directed and mark-directed behav­
iors would seem to require the ability to project, as it were, proprioceptive 
information and kinesthetic feedback onto the reflected visual image so as 
to coordinate the appropriate visually guided movements via the mirror’ (p. 
87).”54 So, while chimpanzee and human toddler’s self-exploratory behav­
ior in front of mirrors is plausibly evidence that chimpanzees and toddlers 
have a concept of the self-as-body, the Body’s “I ," it does not show that they 
have the concept of self as a mind. The capacity for kinesthetic feedback 
may suffice for generating mirror self-recognition.55
What does the absence of self-exploratory behaviors in front of mirrors 
show? It does not show that the creature lacks any concept of self. Indeed, 
it may well be the case that creatures can “fail” the minor task while having 
a psychological understanding of the self. If, for instance, Povinelli’s theory 
of mirror self-recognition is right, then a system of kinesthetic monitoring 
plays a crucial role in minor self-recognition. As a result, creatures that lack 
this kinesthetic monitoring might well fail the mirror self-recognition task. 
But it’s quite possible that a creature can have an understanding of the self- 
as-mind without kinesthetic monitoring. A subject that lacked any kines­
thetic monitoring might know that people (including himself) have beliefs 
and desires without being able to detect the contingencies between his bod­
ily movement and that of his mirror image. Indeed, the possibility of a dis­
sociation between mirror self-recognition and self-awareness has recently 
been given some empirical support. Breen and colleagues report cases in 
which subjects have deficits in mirror self-recognition (i.e., they do not rec­
ognize themselves in mirrors) but apparently no deficit in self-awareness.55
The upshot is that while mirror self-recognition provides evidence of 
some concept of self, the mirror tasks don’t tell us much about the subject’s 
understanding of herself as a subject of psychological states. It’s possible to 
exhibit mirror self-recognition while having no understanding of the self-as- 
mind, and it’s possible that creatures can have an understanding of the self- 
as-mind even if they don’t exhibit mirror self-recognition.
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Although mirror tasks seem to provide no evidence that a creature under­
stands itself as having psychological states, the work in Theory of Mind pro­
vides a wealth of evidence on this in humans. There is little question now 
that preschool children understand that they (and others) have psychologi­
cal states. Thus, the child’s Theory of Mind obviously provides the basis for 
a psychological understanding of the self.
Unfortunately, the task of characterizing the young child’s concept of 
self has not yet received sustained attention by researchers drawing on the 
Theory of Mind tradition. However, the view that the concept of self 
depends on Theory of Mind has been suggested by various authors in dif­
ferent ways.57 It’s also implicit in the Theory Theory of self-awareness, since 
on that theory, the child’s understanding of her own psychological states 
depends on the Theory of Mind. Perhaps the most explicit statement that the 
concept of self depends on Theory of Mind comes from Henry Wellman:
[OJur understanding of ourselves partakes of and is limited by 
our framework belief-desire psychology. . . .  Thoughts, desires, 
basic emotions, actions, perceptions and so on, as specified by 
belief-desire psychology, are the basic categories that frame spe­
cific person concepts. Everyday theory of mind provides the 
infrastructure for self-conception.58
Wellman doesn’t directly consider mirror self-recognition, but it’s reason­
able to assume that he would, in line with the discussion above, maintain 
that mirror self-recognition does not show anything about the child’s under­
standing of the self as a psychological subject. Once we put the concept of 
self-as-body to the side, Wellman seems to be suggesting that the child’s 
concept of self depends crucially on the Theory of Mind. We might call this 
concept the Theory of  Mind’s “I. ”
As noted above, there is disappointingly little written in this tradition 
on the child’s concept of self. Earlier developmental work on the child’s 
concept of self produced the bizarre finding that children seemed to identify 
the self primarily with physical features in free-recall tests.59 For example, 
when young children are asked, “What will (not) change about yourself 
when you grow up?” seven-year-olds tended to refer to physical character­
istics (e.g., hair color) and veiy seldom referred to psychological character­
istics.60 Indeed, one prominent view was that young children had only a 
“physicalistic” conception of the self.61 This body of findings seemed 
increasingly peculiar in light of the emerging body of evidence on the young 
child’s extraordinary capacities in Theory of Mind. The research on Theory 
of Mind clearly demonstrates that young children attain considerable sophis­
tication about the mind well before the age of seven. Hence, it’s puzzling 
that they should identify themselves solely with their physical features.
THE THEORY OF MIND'S “I”
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In a set of recent experiments motivated partly by these considerations, 
Daniel Hart and colleagues found that although children tended to appeal to 
their physical features in standard free-recall tasks about the self, the same 
children regard their psychological characteristics as most important to their 
self.62 Hart and colleagues used philosophically inspired thought experi­
ments on personal identity to explore this. In one condition, the child is 
shown a model of a “person machine” and is told the following:
This is a person machine. What the machine does is make per­
sons. The person behind this door gets an exact copy of your 
body and looks exactly like you. But this person . . . does not 
have your thoughts and feelings. . . . The person behind this 
door . . . has an exact copy of your thoughts and feelings. . . .
But this person does not have your body or look like you.63
The subject was then asked, “Which of these two persons is closest to being 
you? The one with your body and appearance or the one with your thoughts 
and feelings?” The researchers compared children’s responses to the person 
machine task with their responses to standard free-recall tasks, and found 
that in the free-recall tasks, the children mentioned physical characteristics 
most often, but in the person machine task, they regarded their psychologi­
cal qualities as most important for the self. Hart and colleagues describe the 
results as follows:
When asked to judge which set of characteristics was most 
important for establishing similarity between the self and a 
hypothetical person, the 7-year-olds in this study most fre­
quently claimed that it is their psychological features; indeed, 
over half of the children claimed that the psychological charac­
teristics are superior for preserving personal identity for all the 
hypothetical transformations posed in this study.64
Philosophers will no doubt notice that this isn’t really a question about per­
sonal identity, since it is explicitly about similarity between simultaneously 
existing persons. However, many children would be upset by imagining that 
they are dismantled shortly after stepping into the person machine, and 
ethics review boards would be unlikely to approve such a study should a 
sadistic experimenter propose it. At any rate, as Hart and colleagues inti­
mate, the person machine task is likely more revealing than free-recall tasks 
for uncovering the child’s theory of the core features of the self.
Hart and colleagues developed their task explicitly in the context of 
Theory of Mind research. And the Theory of Mind is plausibly implicated 
in the person machine task since the task requires the subject to judge the 
importance of psychological properties for similarity across individuals. The 
findings on the person machine task begin to tell us a bit about the Theory 
of Mind’s “I,” then. They suggest that on the concept of self delivered by
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the Theory of Mind, the most important features of the self are one’s psy­
chological properties.65 Presumably children don’t have this understanding 
of self until they have a Theory of Mind. Hence, at least for this concept of 
self, Wellman is right: “Everyday theory of mind provides the infrastructure 
for self-conception.”
THE MIND’S “I”
So, the Theory of Mind apparently delivers a concept of self as a mind, and 
this concept needs to be distinguished from the concept of self-as-body. 
However, the Monitoring Mechanism account suggests that there is another, 
more basic concept of self that is independent of Theory of Mind, what one 
might call the Mind’s “I.”
The Monitoring Mechanism sketched in section II produces beliefs 
about one’s own mental states. That is, it produces representations of the 
form I believe p, I desire q, I imagine i; etc. Thus, as the source of such self­
attribution, this mechanism delivers representations in which the concept, /, 
is the subject of mental states. Since the Monitoring Mechanism is pre­
sumed to be innate, one of the implications of the account is that this con­
cept of the self as subject is also innate.
The Mind's “I” is distinct from both of the self-concepts discussed 
above. It’s distinct from the Body’s “I” since the Mind’s “I” is explicitly the 
subject of psychological states. There is no a priori reason to think that this 
concept of self will covary with the concept of self that is revealed through 
mirror self-recognition. It’s certainly possible that the concept of the Mind’s 
“I” is present in creatures that lack the concept of the Body’s “I.” For 
instance, if Povinelli is right, minor self-recognition depends on a keen sys­
tem of kinesthetic monitoring in humans and chimpanzees. But of course, 
the evolutionary pressures that led to a keen system of kinesthetic monitor­
ing may well be quite different from those that led to mental state monitor­
ing. And, as noted earlier, a creature might well be able to recognize its own 
mental states without recognizing the contingencies between its movements 
and the movements in the minor.66
Thus, the Monitoring Mechanism delivers a concept of the self as a 
mind, rather than a body. However, this is a concept of self-as-mind that 
does not depend on Theory of Mind. Rather, it is present in humans before 
Theory of Mind has matured, and it may be present in creatures that don’t 
have Theory of Mind. In contrast to Wellman’s claim, then, there is a basic 
concept of the self as a psychological subject for which the Theory of Mind 
does not provide the infrastructure. And while the concept of self that 
depends on Theory of Mind may well exhibit cross-cultural variation,67 the 
Mind’s “I” is unlikely to be cross-culturally variable for it is a direct output 
of an innate and early emerging module.
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It’s worth emphasizing that on the Monitoring Mechanism account, the 
fact that this basic concept of “I” is delivered by introspection in no way 
suggests that there is a phenomenologically salient sense of the self as psy­
chological subject. That is, this basic concept of the self as a psychological 
subject conies from a specialized computational module, not from any phe­
nomenological features that the self might have.58
Thus far. I’ve focused largely on what this concept of self is not; it is 
harder to provide a positive characterization of the concept since psycholo­
gists have not studied it systematically. By hypothesis, one of the functional 
properties of this concept of self is to underwrite self-attribution, and the 
concept is exploited in young children’s early attributions of mental states 
to themselves; this concept is presumably also connected to action systems. 
But what does this self-concept specify as the core features of the self? It’s 
likely that this concept of self contains virtually no information about the 
essential features of the self. As we’ve seen, the concept of self that depends 
on Theory of Mind seems to provide a rich characterization of the essential 
features of the self on which a person’s psychological properties are crucial 
to the self. By contrast, the computational characteristics of the Monitoring 
Mechanism suggest that, while this simple mechanism does deliver a con­
cept of self, this concept does not include any specification of the core fea­
tures of the self.
Despite its exiguous content, this concept of self can support judgments 
of personal identity. I currently desire that it not rain, since I’ve discovered 
that my roof is leaking. And the Monitoring Mechanism can detect this 
desire. However, before I discovered the leak, I desired extensive rain to 
relieve the dustbowl that is my backyard. So, several weeks ago, the 
Monitoring Mechanism produced the belief that I want it to rain, and that 
belief was converted into the memory that I wanted it to rain. More recently, 
my desires have changed, and the Monitoring Mechanism produces the 
belief that I currently desire that it not rain. So, the Monitoring Mechanism 
is the basis for the representations I wanted it to min and I want it not to 
rain. And it’s plausible that I can use such beliefs as the basis for the judg­
ment that although I wanted rain previously I do not want it now. Of course, 
I can have several mental states at once, and the Monitoring Mechanism 
might deliver, e.g., the belief that I currently desire to go to the store and to 
listen to music. The upshot of this is that the Monitoring Mechanism pro­
vides the basis for making judgments of personal identity both synchroni- 
cally and diachronically. I am the same person who wanted it to rain several 
weeks ago and currently wants it not to rain. I am also the same person who 
wants to go to the store and to listen to music.69
Although it hasn’t been systematically studied, it’s likely that these kinds 
of judgments of identity are implicit in self-attributions of young children.
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Consider, for instance, the following exchanges from the CHILDES 
database:
Abe (3;3): I didn’t get you a surprise.
Adult: You didn’t. I’m sad.
Abe: No, don’t be sad. I thought I would ’cept I didn’t
see one for you.
Adult: Do you remember [what you got as a present]?
Abe (3;3): A net. [a basketball hoop]
Adult: Uh huh.
Abe: ’Cept I didn’t w'ant it. I wanted a bat and baseball.
Adult: I thought it was a bus.
Adam (3;3): It's a bus. I thought a taxi.70
In all of these cases, the child seems to make an implicit judgment of iden­
tity across time. For instance, Abe reports that he previously thought that he 
would get his father a surprise, but that he didn’t see one. Similarly, in the 
experimental work on theory of mind and self-attributions, young children 
seem to make these kinds of implicit identity judgments. For instance, in an 
experiment by Gopnik and Virginia Slaughter, the subject is shown a draw­
ing of a turtle and then switches seats with the experimenter and asked, 
“Before we traded seats, how did you see the turtle then, lying on his back 
or standing on his feet?”71 The young child reports that before changing 
seats, she saw the turtle differently than she does now. And in recent work 
by Tim German and Alan Leslie, the young child attributes a past false 
belief to himself to explain his past action, saying that he looked for the bait 
in the wrong box “because that’s where I thought it was.” In these cases as 
well, the child seems to identify herself with a subject of a past psycholog­
ical state that differs from her current psychological state.
Some might maintain that this early concept of self is so content-poor 
that it cannot be regarded as a genuine concept of self. Rather, perhaps we 
should say that the Monitoring Mechanism delivers a “proto-concept” of 
self, and that it is only after the child can also exploit the Theory of Mind 
that she can be said to have a genuine concept of self.721 don’t know how to 
decide these questions about the genuineness of concepts, but for present 
purposes I don’t think it matters much, and I mean to use the term “concept” 
broadly enough to include such “proto-concepts.” What is crucial is that the 
Monitoring Mechanism delivers an “I” which, whether a genuine concept of 
self or not, suffices for self-attribution and for judgments of personal iden­
tity across time.
The Monitoring Mechanism account thus suggests that there is a basic 
concept of self as a psychological subject that has been largely neglected in 
the psychological literature. The mirror self-recognition tasks don’t show 
understanding of the self as a psychological subject. A large body of evi­
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dence in the Theory of Mind tradition does show that children have some 
psychological understanding of the self, and recent research indicates that 
psychological properties are regarded as central to the self by children. 
However, the Monitoring Mechanism account suggests an earlier innate 
notion of the self on which the self is subject of psychological states. This 
concept of self is not shown by the mirror self-recognition tasks, nor is it 
dependent on the Theory of Mind.
IV. THE SELF-CONCEPT IN PHILOSOPHY
One of the enduring issues in philosophy of mind and metaphysics has been 
the attempt to characterize the conditions under which a person at one time 
is identical to a person at another time. Of course, one of the reasons this 
project is of interest is that by characterizing the conditions for personal 
identity, one thereby characterizes the essential features of the self. The 
problem of personal identity has seemed to many to be one of the deepest 
and most difficult problems in philosophy of mind and metaphysics. The 
difficulty is that it has seemed impossible to develop an account of the self 
and personal identity that coheres with all of our intuitions. Indeed, Colin 
McGinn has recently argued that the reason the problem is so perplexing is 
that we lack the cognitive resources to solve it.731 want to suggest a rather 
different kind of explanation for why we are unable to reconcile our intu­
itions about the self. The deeply puzzling problems arise, I’ll suggest, 
because we have two quite different cognitive mechanisms that generate 
judgments about the self.
The problem of personal identity is often characterized as a conflict 
between intuitions issuing from the third-person perspective and intuitions 
issuing from a first-person perspective.74 The point is nicely put by Thomas 
Nagel:
The problem [of personal identity] seems unreal when persons 
are viewed as beings in the world, whether physical or mental.
They persist and change through time, and those are the terms in 
which they must be described . . . the persistent dissatisfaction 
with candidate analyses of this form derives from a submerged 
internal aspect of the problem which is left untouched by all 
; external treatments. From the point of view of the person himself, 
the question of his identity or nonidentity with someone under­
going some experience in the future appears to have a content 
that cannot be exhausted by any account in terms of memory, 
similarity of character, or physical continuity. Such analyses are 
never sufficient, and from this point of view they may appeal' not 
even to supply necessary conditions for identity.75
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I think that the psychological work on the self concept suggests an explana­
tion for the conflict that Nagel presents. The idea is that, in general, the 
third-person perspective on the self recruits the Theory of Mind and the 
first-person perspective recruits the Monitoring Mechanism; as a result, dif­
ferent concepts of the self are implicated from the different perspectives. 
That is, the third-person perspective and first-person perspective thought 
experiments recruit different cognitive mechanisms that exploit different 
concepts of the self.76 In the remainder of this section, I’ll try to clarify this 
suggestion.
In the philosophical literature on the self, one of the best known 
thought experiments from the third-person perspective comes from Bernard 
Williams.77 Drawing from a classic Lockean example, Williams asks us to 
imagine that a mad scientist will perform an operation on two persons, A 
and B. Each patient will have his psychological properties (thoughts, feel­
ings, personality traits) “removed” from his brain and transferred into the 
brain of the other person. As a result, the A-body person will have the psy­
chological properties that B had before the switch, and the B-body person 
will have the psychological properties that A had before the switch. Before 
the operation, the procedure is explained to A and B, and they are told that 
after the transfer, one of the resulting persons will be tortured and the other 
will be given a large sum of money; A and B are then allowed to request 
which body gets the torture and which the money (of course, it may be 
impossible for the mad scientist to grant both of their requests). After the 
operation, the subjects are asked whether they got what they requested.
Beginning with Locke’s initial presentation of these sorts of cases, most 
philosophers have the intuition that this seems to be a case of body-swap- 
ping—in virtue of the transfer of their psychological properties, A and B 
have switched bodies.78 Williams makes this seem particularly compelling 
by considering the range of possible responses A and B would make before 
and after the transfer. For the B-body person will “remember” A’s request, 
and as a result, the B-body person will say he got what he asked for if and 
only if A’s request was met (and the situation is analogous for the A-body 
person). Thus, Williams maintains that from the third-person perspective it 
seems that to transfer psychological properties is to transfer the self. 
Thought experiments like Williams’s third-person case have led philoso­
phers to develop accounts of the self according to which continuity of psy­
chological properties is essential to personal identity.79 Intuitions about these 
third-person cases presumably depend on Theory of Mind, since the thought 
experiments require fairly sophisticated reasoning about others’ psycholog­
ical properties. And the philosophical intuitions about these cases seem to 
fit with the available psychological evidence on the concept of self that is 
delivered by the Theory of Mind. The evidence indicates that, at least in
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western culture, psychological properties are regarded as essential features 
of the self. And the emerging evidence from developmental psychology 
indicates that children share this intuition. Indeed, the Lockean thought 
experiment is a direct ancestor of the task used in the developmental work 
on the Theory of Mind-concept of self.
When we turn to the philosophical intuitions from the first-person per­
spective, the situation is quite different. The problem is that from the first- 
person perspective, continuity of psychological properties does not seem 
essential to personal identity; but neither does continuity of physical prop­
erties. Nagel puts the point as follows:
The concept of the self seems suspiciously pure—too pure— 
when we look at it from inside. . . . When I consider my own 
individual life from inside, it seems that my existence in the 
future or the past—the existence of the same “1” as this one— 
depends on nothing but itself. . . .  My nature then appears to be 
at least conceptually independent not only of bodily continuity 
but also of all other subjective mental conditions, such as mem­
ory and psychological similarity. The migration of the self from 
one body to another seems conceivable, even if it is not in fact 
possible. So does the persistence of the self over a total break in 
psychological continuity— as in the fantasy of reincarnation 
without memory. If all these things are really possible, I cer­
tainly can’t be an organism: I must be a pure, featureless mental 
receptacle.80
I’ve suggested that the third-person perspective thought experiments 
exploit the Theory of Mind. When we take the first-person perspective on 
the self, it’s plausible that we are using the Monitoring Mechanism, since 
our distinctive access to our own minds is largely subserved by that mecha­
nism. From the third-person perspective, psychological continuity seems to 
be crucial to identity across time. But from the first-person perspective, psy­
chological continuity seems quite inessential to identity across time, as 
Nagel suggests—it’s possible to imagine one’s self existing after a radical 
disruption in psychological or physical properties. Just as the first-person 
perspective thought experiments suggest that the self lacks essential con­
nections to psychological or physical properties, we saw in section III that 
the concept of self delivered by the Monitoring Mechanism likely lacks any 
specifications of the nature of the self. The Monitoring Mechanism delivers 
a concept of self as subject of mental states, and young children exploit this 
mechanism to make judgments of identity across time. However, the con­
cept of self delivered by the Monitoring Mechanism does not provide any 
characterization of the core features of the self. As a result, if our first-per­
son thought experiments recruit the Monitoring Mechanism and isolate this 
concept of self, presumably such thought experiments will not produce the
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intuition that continuity of psychological properties or physical properties is 
required for identity across time. Rather, if we try to characterize the self by 
relying on the Monitoring Mechanism and its attendant concept of self, we 
seem to arrive at something close to Nagel’s characterization of the self 
from the first-person perspective: “a pure, featureless mental receptacle.”
If this is right, we have an explanation for why it has been so difficult 
to develop an account of the self that satisfies all of our intuitions about the 
self. The problem is that we have two sources of intuitions about the self. 
One source depends crucially on the Monitoring Mechanism; the other 
source depends on the Theory of Mind. These cognitive mechanisms exploit 
quite different self-concepts which generate incompatible intuitions about 
the nature of the self.81 As a result, the philosophical task of developing a 
theory that can accommodate both the third-person and the first-person intu­
itions about the self is likely to be hopeless.
This is not the place to defend a positive metaphysics of the self. But 
the above diagnosis of the problem suggests that we should be suspicious of 
intuitions about the self that issue from the first-person perspective. For on 
the account I’ve suggested, the generation of these first-person intuitions 
typically depends on a rather simple module, which exploits a quite mini­
mal concept of self. And the function of the module is to inform the subject 
of her mental states, not to inform the subject of the nature of the self. A 
central characteristic of modules is that they are very good at a certain range 
of tasks and very bad at pretty much everything else. Obviously, the 
Monitoring Mechanism is very good at detecting one’s own mental states. 
In fact, the Monitoring Mechanism is much better at detecting one’s own 
mental states than any other source, including Theory of Mind and contem­
porary scientific psychology. But, the Monitoring Mechanism is likely a 
very poor source for trying to build a philosophically viable account of the 
self.
V. CONCLUSION
Recent work on development and psychopathologies provides a tremendous 
resource for developing a cognitive account of introspection. This work sug­
gests that there is a dedicated cognitive mechanism for detecting one’s own 
mental states, a Monitoring Mechanism. I’ve argued that the psychological 
work also indicates that it’s important to distinguish between different con­
cepts of the self. In particular, the Monitoring Mechanism delivers a concept 
of self that needs to be distinguished from the richer concept of self that 
depends on the Theory of Mind. I ’ve suggested that this distinction can 
begin to illuminate why the first-person and third-person perspectives gen­
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erate such deeply conflicting intuitions about the nature of the self. The 
problem is that the first-person and third-person perspectives exploit differ­
ent cognitive mechanisms with different and incompatible concepts of the 
self. Obviously I have only offered the sketchiest defense of this proposal. 
But I hope to have shown that we should take seriously the possibility that 
a cognitive account of introspection might help us understand why the 
philosophical problem of the self has been so intractable.
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